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l. Context: One or two pretty old ideas
The double object construction has been argued to encode a lower predicate of 
which the ‘dative’ indirect object is really the subject (Kayne 1983; Larson 1988; 
Basilico 1998). On this view, the idea comes readily to m ind that what this predica- 
tion encodes is a relation similar to ‘possession’ —  a sentence such as
(1) I’ll give Otto a gun.
after all means something like TU do something to the effect that Otto has a gun. 
This picture clearly has its appeal: Frequently across languages, we find that 
‘possession is expressed employing dative (or locative) case and the verb be (Freeze 
1992). ‘High indirect objects’ like ‘Otto’ in (1) show properties typical of subjects, 
ranging from extraction facts (German, cf. Hudson 1992 for English) over trigger- 
ing agreement on the verb (e.g. Bantu languages) to semantic and discourse 
properties such as ‘proto-agenthood’ (Dowty 1991) and topichood.1 In the next 
section, we will look at the referential properties of IOs. This will support the idea 
that high IOs and subjects are akin and lead to the hypothesis that is only put 
forward in the section thereafter.
2. Observations: Referential properties of IOs
There are interesting differences as respects the Interpretation of the IO in the 
‘prepositional object construction’ (POC, ‘low IO’) and the ‘double object con-
struction’ (DOC, ‘high IO’).2
Robustly, a strongly quantihed low IO can take non-surface scope over a weakly 
quantihed direct object (DO), while a strongly quantihed DO cannot take scope 
over a high IO:
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(2) a. The teacher assigned an exercise to every Student. [PO C ,‘low IO’]
b. The teacher assigned a student every exercise. [DOC, ‘high IO’]
While in (2a) the universal quantifier can and preferably does take scope over the 
existential (~ Vx student(x) —> 3y exercise(y)...), the universal quantifier has to 
take narrow scope with respect to the existential in (2b) (~ 3x student(x) a  Vy 
exercise(y)...). In this connection, the following contrast is a telling one:
(3) a. Ede promised his fortune to a martian.
b. Ede promised a martian his fortune.
It seems that while (3a) does not commit us to the existence of martians, (3b) does 
—  standardly one would want to say that while the low IO takes narrow scope with 
respect to the intensional verb ‘promise’ and is interpreted de dicto, the high IO 
takes wide scope and is interpreted de re. Although this effect is similar with other 
ditransitive verbs, judgments are not always so clear in the domain of singular 
indefinites.3 But consider Bare Plurals:
(4) a. My neighbor (??once) sold schoolkids drugs.
b. My neighbor (once) sold drugs to schoolkids.
(4a) strongly suggests that my neighbor generally or habitually sold drugs to 
schoolkids, hence the oddity here with ‘once’. (4b) is fine, being compatible with 
my neighbor selling drugs to schoolkids on just one occasion. This effect becomes 
more dramatic if a true ‘once only’-predicate in combination with a bare plural IO 
is chosen:
(5) a. ??Anna fed crocodiles Otto.
b. Anna fed Otto to crocodiles.
The DOC in (5a) seems to require that it was Annas custom to feed Otto to croco-
diles —  something that is incompatible with Otto’s being an individual that can be 
had for dinner only once. (5b) seems perfectly fine, the POC not giving rise to such 
an interpretation. Intuitively, the bare Plural in the DOC has to be interpreted 
generically, which should go along with some kind of generic quantihcation over 
the event in which it takes part. However, the event in (5a) is ‘once only’, hence the 
oddity. In (5b) on the other hand, there is no problem of interpreting the IO 
existentially. Roughly, there are some crocodiles that beneht from an event o f ‘Anna 
feeding Otto’.
Let us record that indefinite singular high IOs take wide scope and that bare 
plural high IOs are interpreted generically. In common terminology, this amounts 
to saying that they are interpreted ‘strong’.4 Low IOs on the other hand may be 
interpreted ‘weak’ also (take narrow scope).
In view of what is to come, it is worhtwhile to say a bit more on the interpreta-
tion of high IOs, something that in traditional terminology runs under the heading
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of ‘uniqueness’. In Russian, Speakers have to make use of a particular suffix that 
can express ‘uniqueness’ in the DOC, the suffix -to. Using -nibud (which can only 
be interpreted with narrow scope or ‘non-specifically’) in the DOC gives rise to a 
highly marginal sentence.5
(6) a. . . .o n d a l  kakom u-to studentu knigu.
he gave some -‘unique’ student-DAT book. 
b. on dal kakom u -nibudstudentu knigu. 
he gave some student-DAT book.
Now this is a nice fact which supports the general point here —  clearly, however, 
‘uniqueness’ in any absolute sense is too strong a notion: ‘Every teacher assigned a 
Student an exercise’ does not imply that the Student be the same for every teacher. 
I would like to suggest that the ‘uniqueness’ we find with high IOs is ‘uniqueness 
qua event’ really, i.e., there is at most one particular IO-referent (or set of referents) 
available per (causing) event that is understood to occur. In terms of scope, this 
means just ‘having wide or identical scope’ w.r.t. the event variable. That this is 
warranted is supported by facts like the following: If we try  to force a ‘one event’ 
reading, having a strongly distributing subject and a high indefinite IO gives rise to 
a weird interpretation:
(7) Ich beobachtete wie an dem O rt zu der Zeit...
I observed how at that place at that time
a. ?jeder Verliebte einer Geliebten Blumen schickte,
every lover a beloved flowers sent
b. jeder Verliebte Blumen zu einer Geliebten schickte,
every lover flowers to a beloved sent
c. ein Verliebter einer Geliebten Blumen schickte, 
a lover a beloved flowers sent
Use of the DOC in (7a) suggests that each and every lover sent flowers to one and the 
same beloved. (7b) is fine, distribution over beloved persons being unproblematic. 
Note that (7c) shows that there is nothing eise wrong with the DOC in this context.
3. Hypothesis: IOs ~ ILP —  subjects
An available distinction that could help explain the properties of high IOs is that 
between ‘stage levei’ (SL) and ‘individual levei’ (IL) predicates. As has been shown 
(Kratzer 1995; Chierchia 1995), subjects of (unergative) IL-predicates are interpret-
ed strong —  as we just found with high IOs.6 The grammatical relevance of the 
distinction is clear, as is a good deal of the associated properties. Let us therefore 
put forward the following hypothesis:
The high IO is the subject ofan individual level predicate
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Right or wrong (a tractable question), it offers a perspective on the following issues 
(a desideratum):
-  What are the licensing conditions for IOs?
-  What is the contribution IOs make to clausal meaning?
4. Where is the state?
The least we would expect for the hypothesis that high IOs are ILP-subjects to go 
through is to see evidence that there is in fact a state present in the DOC. Self- 
evidently, IL-predications give rise to Stative sentences (they have the subinterval 
property, go with durative adverbs etc.).
4.1 Temporal modification
Looking at patterns involving temporal modification, we see that a state is readily 
available in the DOC, but not in the POC:
(8) a. I’ll give you the car tomorrow.
b. H l give the car to you tomorrow.
(9) a. Otto will lend Anna his appartm ent while he is in Botswana.
b. ?O tto will lend his appartm ent to Anna while he is in Botswana.
(cf. Mc Cawley 1974)
(10) a. The students were promising Lempel the papers (until) next week.
b. ??The students were promising the papers to Lempel (until) next week.
In (8a), ‘tomorrow’ is preferably understood as specifying the extension of ‘you 
having the car’: It functions as a durative adverbial that measures out a state. In 
(8b), ‘tomorrow’ rather locates the occurrence of an evento igiving, i.e., it functions 
as a frame adverbial here. The same applies to the next example: (9a) means that 
‘Anna will have the appartment while Otto is in Botswana’. (9b) is somewhat 
stränge since we do not expect Otto to engage in lending his appartment when he 
is in Botswana already. While (10a) purports to saying that ‘Lempel will have the 
papers by next week’, (10b) forces on us an Interpretation that is somewhat surreal: 
For it to come out true, it seems the students would have to have begun promising 
in the past and keep promising until next week.7
The patterns we encounter not only lend support to the hypothesis that there 
is in fact a state present in the DOC, they also provide a piece of evidence against a 
‘Small Clause’ analysis of DOCs. At least with paradigm examples of what are 
believed to be small clauses, we find that the SC-predication cannot be indepen- 
dently modihed temporally:8
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(11) a. I found Peter sick yesterday. *  I found that [Peterwas sickyesterday.]
b. I considered Peter the gardener yesterday. *  I considered that [Peter was the 
gardener yesterday.]
4.2 Ellipsis
Now one might object that temporal modification cannot in principie supply 
sufficient evidence for claims about what is syntactically encoded or not, being 
itself maybe not a core syntactic phenomenon. Indeed, a look at ellipsis data 
initially seems to refute the idea that a state is there in syntax also. Consider the 
following example:
(12) The boss is offering Anna more money than Otto.
This cannot mean that ‘the boss is offering Anna [more money than Otto has]’, 
which we would expect: On the assumption that comparative ellipsis is licensed iff 
what is elided is ‘LF identical’ with an antecedent, why should a structurally present 
state not feed comparative ellipsis?9
On closer inspection, it turns out that this negative conclusion is too hasty. In 
fact, we can compare a state in the DOC, as the following examples show:
(13) Om mijn zoontje gerust te stellen ...
a. zal ik hem meer via geven.
b. zal ik meer via aan hem  geven.
(14) a. Der Boss übergibt Anna m ehr Verantwortung.
the boss is-giving Anna more responsibility
b. Der Boss übergibt m ehr Verantwortung an Anna,
the boss is-giving more responsibility to Anna
(13a) has a reading that amounts to the following: TU increase my son’s vla-stock’ 
(‘via’ is a prom inent Dutch dessert). Importantly, it is not events that are compared 
here (like in 13b), but States, expressing amounts of via at the son’s disposal. The 
same applies to (14a) and (14b): While (14a) has a reading that just says that Annas 
amount of responsibility will increase, ( 14b) does not seem to have that reading — 
rather, the comparison here is with alternative giving-events. Again, there is a ‘state 
comparison’ —  reading in the DOC in (14a), but only an ‘event comparison’ — 
reading in the POC in (14b).10
If we believe in the structural nature of comparative ellipsis, then this is
evidence that there is in fact a state encoded in the syntactic structure of the DOC,
but not the POC. While I cannot supply a real analysis of the ellipsis data at this 
point, the direction such an analysis should take is clear: We know that the high IO 
takes wide scope. It seems plausible for independent reasons that structurally, the 
high IO is merged above the subject actually (cf. below). If we make the natural 
assumption that the licensing of the subject (here: agent) argument is closely
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connected to having a (causing) event, then it is but a small step to argue that if we 
abstract over the high IO to construct the appropriate LF-predicate for comparative 
ellipsis, we necessarily leave the event argument behind in that predicate. Now if 
there is something to the ‘event-unique’ interpretation of high IOs, then having 
different IO-referents will imply quantiücation over different events also.
Note that the mere difference between (12) and (13a), (14a) respectively is that 
in the latter DOCs where we get the state comparison reading, the IO is ‘kept 
constant’. For some reason, it is possible under these circumstances to construct a 
predicate just consisting of the state. One could argue that abstraction is over the IO 
and the event argument, leaving two LF-identical States, or that identical material 
‘above’ what is actually compared does not matter (i.e., can be ignored. Note that 
the ‘event comparison reading is also available in the DOC). With these indica- 
tions, Fll leave this interesting issue to another occasion.
5. Analysis
Having seen some evidence in favor of the idea that there is in fact a state encoded 
in the DOC also structurally, let’s now turn  to analysis. On the ‘semantic side, a 
proposal that is well in line with what has been said so far is that of Szabolcsi 1994 
(and earlier). Szabolcsi argues that at least in Hungarian, sentences involving 
hflve-predication are in fact presentational sentences after possessor raising. The 
reason why the possessor has to raise is precisely that it is quantiüed and therefore 
has to get out of the scope of the presentational sentence. Here is an example from 
Szabolcsi:
(15) M ari-nak van -nakkalap-ja -i. [Hungarian]
M a r i- D A T b e - P A S T -3 P L  h a t  - p o s s 3 s g - p l
‘M ari had hats.’
On the syntactic side, the more elaborate analyses of dative alternation (Larson 
1988; Den Dikken 1995:109ff) seem readily available to implement this. The core 
idea that these analyses share is that the DOC is derived from the POC in roughly 
the following manner: the preposition to incorporates into empty be, giving rise to 
(empty) have. The DP complement of the preposition has to raise then to a position 
where it can be case-licensed.
This line of thinking has its problems, however. It is a simple, hitherto still 
ignored fact that in many Germanic languages (including dialects of English), the 
following construction is perfectly natural:
(16) Ich schickte Meier-d a t  die Akten (runter) ins Büro.
I sent Meier the files down into-the office.
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As it turns out, both a ‘high’ and a ‘low’ IO may peacefully coexist in one and the 
same structure —  quite a mystery if the high IO is derived from the low IO. Data 
like in (16) indeed put quite some burden on a transformation/incorporation 
analysis —  to see this, suppose that (most in line with Szabolcsi’s proposal), (16) is 
actually derived from
(17) I sent the files [PP to [DP [DP/D Meyer’s] office.]]
I sent the files [PP to the office [PP of Meyer.] ]
Roughly, the high dative Starts out as a possessor within the lower PP and is raised 
from there. While this comes close to what we understand (16) to mean, syntacti- 
cally it does not seem feasible: On the view that the high IO is licensed through 
incorporation, serious complications relating especially to the HMC arise.11
Given this and what has been discussed earlier on, a view like the following 
suggests itself: The high IO is not an argument that is projected by the base verb, 
nor is it licensed in any direct way by other (possibly empty) lexical material. 
Rather, DOCs comprise an extra predication ‘qua construction’ (where as far as I 
can see, ‘construction’ can be taken to correspond to the functional layer above V 
in minimalist terms).12
Before we put forward a proposal concerning representation, however, let’s 
recapitulate and get back for a moment to the hypothesis that the high IO is the 
subject of an ILP. For this to be viable, something that counts as an ILP has to be 
around to be predicated of the high IO (and the high IO should also c-command 
this ILP under standard assumptions).
Chierchia 1995 and McNally 1998 argue that the crucial identihcation criterion 
for individual-level predication is its ‘location independence’. If a subject is ascribed 
a property by an ILP, it will ceteris paribus keep that property, no matter whether 
the subjects referent changes (spatiotemporal) location.13 Intuitively, this takes care 
immediately of one paradigm case of DOCs, namely predicates encoding transfer:
(18) Otto {gave, sold, borrowed, handed} Anna the keys in the bar yesterday.
Unless we are explicitly informed otherwise, we understand that the keys are still 
with Anna —  quite independent of the fact that it is not yesterday anymore and 
independent of whether she is still in that bar or not. The same is true more 
generally of any event happening in somebody’s interest, that is, in constructions 
expressing benefactives in the widest sense. What seems crucial is that the event be 
‘perfected’: For an event to have happened, it has to have come to its end to begin 
with. Consider the following examples, the second of which crucially is ok in 
English, even though English is held not to feature ‘free datives’:14
(19) a. O tto sang (a song).
b. Otto sang me a song.
c. ??O tto sang me songs.
d. *Otto sang me.
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Roughly, if something happens in somebody’s interest (or the like), it will —  in fact 
forever —  have happened in the interest (or the like) of that somebody, no matter 
where he/she goes. Somewhat poetically: The singing of that song in (19b) is ‘with 
me’, no matter when, where or what. (19c) and (19d) are no good since the singing 
event there is not ‘delimited’ and therefore cannot be ‘perfected’.15
For representation, I adopt a proposal from Kratzer 1994. I submit that the 
extra predication we ünd in DOCs is of a particular basic nature, namely that of a 
presentational sentence. For these, Kratzer argues that they comprise a raising 
copula and a clitic corresponding to German ‘da’, where ‘da’ denotes a spatio- 
temporal location. Semantically, in a presentational sentence a Situation is predicat- 
ed of that spatiotemporal location. Kratzer gives the following translation for the 
raising copula (applied to the clitic already):
beraising ditic = location (there, s)
We do in fact ünd the spatiotemporal pronoun ‘da’ in DOCs in German also. 
Crucially, the high IO has to appear to its left:
(20) a. Ich schickte Anna da ein Paket hin.
b. Ich schickte Anna ein Paket da hin.
c. *Ich schickte da Anna ein Paket hin.
‘I sent Anna a parcel there to.’
Simplifying somewhat, ‘da’ marks the shed between restriction (~ subject) and 
scope (~ predicate) of a presentational sentence. I suggest that it does just the same
in DOCs, only nothing is forced to appear to its left (like an expletive in a matrix
sentence), since we’re dealing with an embedded predication (so SVO is not 
forced). However, the high IO —  if there is one —  has to appear to the left of ‘da’ 
since it is strong and therefore must not appear in the scope of the presentational 
predication. Basically, this is just Szabolcsi’s story from above.16 Taking Kratzer’s 
perspective, what the high IO really does is restrict the spatiotemporal location that 
is the subject of the presentational sentence, where the predicate is a Situation.
At this stage, I will put all the representational burden on small v and leave the 
question whether it should be ‘split’ into e.g. a seperate Aspect Phrase and/or Tense 
Phrase to the future. For space reasons, I only put down here the step where small 
v combines with the VP for a simplified example derivation, modelled on Kratzer’s 
1994 proposals:
1. VP = send Anna (to) home = Xe [sending(e) & them e(anna,e) & to home(e) & 
f-target(e) = athom e(anna)]
2. v = XP Xy Xz Xs 3e [P(e) & s = f-target(e) & agent(y,e) & location(z,s)]
3. vP = Xy Xz Xs 3e [sending(e) & s = f-target(e) = at home(anna) & theme(anna, e) 
& to  home(e) & agent(y,e) & location(z,s)] (ede) (otto)
= Xs 3e [sending(e) & s = f-target(e) = at hom e(anna) & to home(e) & 
them e(anna,e) & agent(ede,e) & location(otto,s)]
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Some comments are in order: Kratzers raising be is part (underlined) of the 
semantics of v. Moreover, v contains Kratzers ‘Perfect’ operator which existentially 
binds the event variable and identiües with its target state a state variable that it 
introduces.17 Apart from an agent argument, v also introduces a spatiotemporal 
location predicated that target state. This ‘Location’ argument is saturated (more 
properly: restricted) by the high IO. The VP and v can combine then via functional 
composition to yield vP.




All the high IO does formally is check the EPP feature of v —  since this is the 
cheapest Operation available at that stage in the derivation, the high IO will be 
merged directly from the numeration into the outer speciüer of v, just like an 
expletive in matrix presentational sentences. The subject on this representation is in 
fact lower than the high IO. Case assignment is not a problem: Since the high IO’s 
case is not structural (cf. Steinbach and Vogel 1998), it will not count as a closer 
GOAL for the PROBE (T) checking structural nominative case (cf. Brandt 1999), 
arguing that the featural content of high IOs is just that of expletives).18
Notes
* I would like to thank Olga Borik, Oystein Nilsen and an anonymous reviewer for valuable 
comments on an earlier Version o f this paper. Errors are o f course mine.
1. Basilico (1998) argues that high IOs are subjects o f categorical judgments (where a categorical 
judgm ent roughly corresponds to the ascription of a property to an individual). On grounds of 
evidence from anaphora, (focussing) adverbs, accenting etc., Brandt (1999) argues that high IOs 
are generally topic expressions.
2. The term inology Tow IO ’ and ‘high IO ’ respectively will become clear below.
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3. The distinction to be made here is that between ‘specificity’ (taking wide scope) and ‘referent- 
iality’ (presupposing existence). One would probably want to argue that with those verbs where 
the high IO is not clearly interpreted referentially (as with e.g. ‘send’ or ‘wire’), a relation of 
intentionality or the like between the agent and the recipient holds (cf. Dowty 1979:192), giving rise 
to opacity on the latter. W ith verbs like ‘promise’, ‘offer’, ‘give’, ‘hand’ o r ‘throw’, this is quite 
clearly not the case. Cf. e.g.
(i) a. Desperately, Myers throws a long pass to someone in defense ... but everybody is 
attacking actually.
b. Desperately, Myers throws someone in defense a long pass ... "b u t everybody is attacking 
actually.
As (b) shows, with ‘throw’ it is odd to deny the existence of an individual that has been made 
reference to by a high IO —  this is straightforwardly explained if we say that what we are 
producing in (b) is a violation o f an existence presupposition.
4. ‘Strength’ as understood here comes closest to the notion o f ‘specificity’ as used in Discourse 
Representation Theory: Being interpreted strong on this view amounts to being quantified (bound 
by an antecedent) outside the immediate clause in which the expression in question appears (or 
seem sto appear).
5. In what corrsponds to the POC in Russian with respect to the pertinent c-com mand relations 
(cf. Larson 1988:336ff), use o f either suffix is fine: on dal knigu kakomu {-to, -nibudj studentu.
6. Note that being the subject o f an ILP and being the subject o f a predicate encoding ‘possession’ 
is no t equated here. For one thing, clearly ILPs do no t have to express ‘possession’ o r the like in a 
narrow sense. For another, it is no t clear that ‘possession’ is always ‘individual level’, as the 
‘existential sentence’ test shows. ‘Inalienable Possession’ is clearly ou t in this environment, while 
this is less so for ‘alienable possession’ (due here presumably to the locative PP):
(i) a. *Es hat ein M ann zwei Beine,
there has a m an two legs
b. ?Es hat ein M ann einen Flut auf dem Kopf,
there has a m an a hat on his head.
7 . That there are in fact two ‘anchors’ for tem poral modifiers in the DOC but no t in the POC 
shows nicely in a ‘Timezone argum ent’ suggested to me by David Pesetsky. Imagine that A is in 
N. Y. where it is Wednesday, and B is in Moscow where it is Thursday already. Now A faxes B a 
letter. B says later:
(i) a. A faxed me a letter on Wednesday.
b. A faxed me a letter on Thursday.
c. A faxed a letter to me on Wednesday.
but not: "A  faxed a letter to me on Thursday.
It seems that B can make reference to the ‘sending’ as well as to the ‘receiving’ end in the DOC, 
while there is no such ‘receiving’ end accessible in the POC.
8. It should be noted that there is anything bu t agreement what a Small Clause should really be. 
Historically, however, a core idea has been that Small Clauses are bare subject-predicate construc- 
tions lacking Tense. An anonymous reviewer points out that w ith adverbs like ‘still’ and ‘againj 
it does indeed look as if what is generally regarded a Small Clause had a tem poral dimension to it. 
I merely note that these adverbs are strongly presuppositional, suggesting that the effect belongs 
to a different domain.
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9. An example where something ‘smaller’ than lexical V is subject to comparative ellipsis is the 
following:
(i) I want m ore toys than  Otto.
Quite clearly, this can mean that ‘I want more toys than Otto has’ (the narrow scope reading as 
opposed to the wide scope reading ‘I want more toys than  Otto wants’)
10. To get the intuition, it may be useful to  consider the following little context:
(i) Otto was holding three balls (which he picked up himself). Even so,
a. Anna threw him  more.
b. ??Anna threw m ore to him.
The first sentence teils us that O tto is in a state o f holding three balls. We may go on then with (a): 
Basically, we pick up the state and compare it with the result state o f Anna’s throwing, which will 
be that Otto has m ore than three balls. (b) is no t a good continuation —  we look for a ball- 
throwing event to compare Anna’s throwing to, bu t such an event is no t contextually given. In 
other words, If  we use a comparative DOC, an antecedent state may do. If we use a comparative 
POC, we need an antecedent event.
u . The widely accepted HM C (Head Movement Constraint) o f Travis (1984) says that head 
movement is strictly local, i.e., it always has to target the next c-com manding head position up. 
The incorporating head licensing the high IO would however have to skip the preposition as well 
as the particle, that is, violate the HMC more than once. More independently o f theory, one may 
often wonder what it is that incorporates on the incorporation line o f thinking: In several 
languages featuring ‘dative alternation’ (e.g. Russian, Bantu, Finnish), the phenom enon does not 
involve prepositions at all. Finally, we would expect high IOs to be able to ‘reconstruct’ if they 
were generated in the vicinity o f low IOs and receive a weak interpretation, which is just what I 
have argued against above.
12. That DOCs carry ‘special meaning’ one would feel hard pressed to  attribute to the verb is 
particularly evident in constructions like the following, which are syntactically just like DOCs in 
all relevant respects, but do no t comprise ‘ditransitive’ verbs:
(i) a. Otto haut Ede einen Nagel *(in die Wand).
Otto hits Ede a nail into the wall
b. Otto sang Anna ein Lied (ins Ohr).
Otto sang Anna a song into-the ear
13. See again note 6 on ‘possession’.
14. I would argue for English that the case-licensing o f high IOs here is a m atter o f PF, along the 
lines o f Neeleman and Reinhart (1998).
15. Note that this condition of ‘perfectivity’ m uch more generally holds for datives. We find it 
w ith (unaccusative) experiencers’ for example (where I make the Standard assumption that the 
PP ‘die Treppe herunter’ delimits the falling-event):
(i) Die Vase fiel mir-DAT *(die Treppe herunter), 
the vase feil me the stairs down
16. It seems to me though that the DO may be definite and just as well appear to the right o f ‘da’ 
(but one may want to look at corpora). A way out, I think, would be to argue that the DO, as well 
as e.g. the PIO, are really absorbed into the predicate which corresponds to a complex event 
description (cf. McNally 1998:302). The high IO is no t part o f  the predicate bu t really its subject.
42
Cf. Marantz (1993) tor arguments that the high IO is ‘outside’ an event it Stands in apredicational 
relationship to.
17. The function ‘f-target’ maps an event onto its expected/intended result state. As noted above, 
this state may just consist o f the ‘causing event’ itself having occurred. It could prove necessary to 
let count something eise as the ‘pertected’ event, for example a subevent or a consequent event of 
the causing’ event. I have to leave discussion of the complications arising to another occasion (but 
cf. Kratzer 1994: Ch.2, pp. 32ff tor directions).
18. W itness also presentational experiencer sentences in German, where the order IO > SU is the 
unm arked one, cf. Steinbach and Vogel (1998). As tar as Standard tests tor relative base positions 
in term s of c-com m and are concerned, these are not clear with respect to the order o f subject/ 
externai argum ent and high IO in either direction. That the high IO may in fact be base generated 
above the subject is suggested by data like the following, which I shortly com m ent on:
(i) Die Maenner-NOM; haben den Frauen-DAT alle-NOM; einen Drink angeboten. 
the men have the women all a drink offered
On the assum ption that quantifier stranding is extraction ou t o f the quantified phrase, the subject 
here seems to  have been base generated lower then the IO.
(ii) .. .weil dem Martin-DAT; seine Eltern-NOM; ein Auto versprochen haben.
because the M artin his parents a car prom ised have
On the assumption that we are dealing with A-binding, the IO c-commands the SU from an 
argument position here.
(iii) .. .weil seine Eltern-NOM; jedem Kind-DAT; Liebe schulden.
because its parents every child love owe
Like (ii), only binding from the IO into the SU is possible even though the surface c-com mand 
relations are SU >IO  —  suggesting that the IO has to c-com m and SU at some relevant level 
(where both IO and SU are in argument positions).
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